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Abstract 
Transferable Development Rights (TDR) programmes have been introduced as an alternative to 
traditional regulatory instruments with proponents arguing that the implementation of these alternative 
programmes leads to similarly effective land-use outcomes with greater efficiency and equity. The 
evaluation of land-use policies is key to improving policy design and implementation processes, and 
particularly important when considering whether alternative policy instruments such as TDR deliver 
preferable outcomes. While some researchers have tried to identify the factors affecting TDR success, 
there has been little research about institutional aspects and the related transaction costs of TDR 
programmes, and their potential effect on policy outcomes. The presence of significant transaction 
costs decreases the efficiency, and can have a negative effect on the success of TDR programmes. 
This paper explores the transaction costs that may arise in TDR programmes with the specific 
objective of gaining a better understanding of which factors influence transaction costs in these 
programmes and why such costs arise. These factors are examined under three categories; 1) the 
characteristics of the transaction; 2) the characteristics of the transactor; and, 3) the characteristics of 
the policy. The paper also examines the different effects of these factors on different parties involved 
in the TDR programmes. 
Keywords: Transferable Development Rights (TDR), Policy Instruments, Policy Analysis, 
Transaction Costs, Institutional Design and Arrangements. 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, direct government interventions, using regulatory instruments in the form of 
zoning, development control, acquisition and eminent domain, and purchase of development rights 
(PDR) programmes, have been the predominant view in planning practice (Wang et al., 2010, Rydin, 
1993, Heimlich and Anderson, 2001). However, the efficacy of these instruments has remained a 
critical concern among planners and economists. The principal criticisms allege relatively low 
efficiency and effectiveness, inequitable outcomes, and significant transaction costs (Fischel, 2000, 
Rydin, 1998, Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990, Mills, 1989, Heikkila, 2000, Nelson, 1977). There is also 
an increasing scepticism about the ability of the regulatory authorities to manage land use and 
development in an efficient and equitable manner. Due to a lack of sufficient knowledge and 
information, it is likely that regulatory authorities underestimate the real costs of losing development 
potential or adapting inappropriate restrictions on valuable lands for preservation (Wang et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, some planners argue that these instruments are associated with high transaction 
and social costs. These costs include both administrative and information costs, as well as opportunity 
costs of not developing or improving the more beneficial areas of society (Mills, 1989, Pogodzinski 
and Sass, 1990). Given these costs and problems, it has been argued that these instruments fail to 
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achieve their objectives and, in particular, they fail to result in optimal land-use patterns (Clinch and 
O'Neill, 2010, Nelson, 1977, Fischel, 2000). 
Having recognised the inefficiency of the traditional regulatory instruments and their 
shortcomings, increasing numbers of land-use planners and economists have been proposing the 
implementation of alternative market-based instruments to implement and manage urban plans 
(Janssen-Jansen et al., 2008, Micelli, 2002, Clinch and O'Neill, 2010). Moreover, successful 
implementation of market-based instruments in environmental policy has generated greater optimism 
and enthusiasm for their application in land-use planning. The principal reason for the proposition is 
that such instruments are more likely to promote efficient (least cost) outcomes in terms of, for 
example, compliance with an environmental objective, and more capable of providing an equitable 
distribution of the marginal costs of preservation through a transfer of funds between parties. In 
addition, the market mechanism addresses the information failures that make it difficult for planners 
using traditional instruments to achieve the same results. 
The Transferable Development Rights (TDR) approach is one of the market-based land-use 
policy instruments, which has been introduced as an alternative to the traditional regulatory 
instruments, such as zoning. TDR programmes have been used in the USA and a number of other 
European and Asian countries for preserving farmlands and ecologically sensitive areas, as well as 
directing future development (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2008, Chan and Hou, 2015, Shahab and Azizi, 
2013, Wang et al., 2010). The Coase theorem is usually considered as the ‘intellectual foundation’ of 
TDR programmes (Wang et al., 2010). According to Coase (1960), market interventions are not 
always desirable, and net social benefits can potentially be maximized, without state regulations, 
through clarifying property rights and also minimizing transaction costs. In other words, the Coase 
Theorem affirms that, in dealing with externalities, where transaction costs are negligible, if property 
rights of any resource can be clearly attributed, market transactions would lead to more efficient 
outcomes than state interventions, through negotiation between parties, regardless of the initial 
allocation of resources (Clinch et al., 2008). TDR programmes commodify development rights and 
(re)establish markets for these rights in a way that they become the currency of development. In 
essence, TDR programmes are designed to assist in defining property rights and establishing a 
property rights market, which can replace direct forms of government intervention in order to 
internalise externalities and cope with market failures (Shahab et al., 2018b). Using the terminology 
of TDR, planners determine ‘sending areas’ that are undesirable or less desirable for development and 
‘receiving areas’ which are designated areas for development (Pruetz and Pruetz, 2007, Nelson et al., 
2011). Under traditional zoning, those in the ‘sending areas’ suffer a welfare loss as they are not 
entitled to develop and those in ‘receiving areas’ gather significant rents from being conferred with 
the right to develop. However, in a TDR programme, those in ‘receiving areas’ must purchase 
development rights from those in the ‘sending areas’. Thus, the approach is consistent with the 
‘polluter pays principle’ whereby there is, effectively, a charge imposed on the developers and 
compensation to those who are denied the development right. In this way, the approach is considered 
to be more equitable than traditional instruments. 
In spite of growing implementation of TDR programmes, there has been little evaluation of 
their design, process, and outcomes (Chan and Hou, 2015, Clinch and O'Neill, 2010, Machemer and 
Kaplowitz, 2002). The main focus of TDR evaluation studies thus far has been identifying the factors 
affecting TDR success through the study of established TDR programmes (Chan and Hou, 2015, 
Kaplowitz et al., 2008, Pruetz and Pruetz, 2007, Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002, Aken et al., 2008). 
Some studies, however, show that many TDR programmes have not met planners’ expectations 
(Pruetz and Standridge, 2008) and some researchers believe that the relative cost-effectiveness of 
market-based instruments, in general, has been exaggerated and requires assessment with a more 
appropriate and realistic approach (Stavins, 1995). The issues surrounding transaction costs, and other 
institutional aspects of designing and implementing TDR programmes, are argued by some authors to 
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be of importance in determining and evaluating the success of these programmes (Shahab et al., 
2017b). The size, type and distribution of transaction costs can affect the efficiency, effectiveness, and 
equity of TDR programmes (Bruening, 2008, Janssen-Jansen, 2008, Shahab et al., 2017a, Messer, 
2007) and can hinder people from participating in the programmes (Tripp and Dudek, 1989, Nelson et 
al., 2011). 
Despite these debates, there has been a lack of empirical studies and analyses of transaction 
costs in TDR programmes, and their potential effects on the success of these programmes. The 
objective of this paper is to address this gap by exploring the factors which influence transaction costs 
in TDR programmes, as well as seeking to understand why they occur and, thereby, to highlight 
where account needs to be taken of such costs when designing and analysing these programmes so as 
to enhance their efficiency and equity. Transaction costs arise in both policy design and policy 
implementation stages, nonetheless, this paper mainly focuses on the costs involved in operating and 
participating in existing TDR programmes. This paper aims to enhance understanding of what 
determines the level of transaction costs in TDR programmes by analysing how some specific factors 
influence it. The paper goes on to discuss the effects of these influencing factors on different 
stakeholders and parties involved in TDR programmes and seeks ways to reduce such costs. 
 
2. What Are Transaction Costs? 
Coase (1937), in his seminal paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’, introduces the concept of 
transaction costs to the study of firm and market organisation. Transaction costs are often defined as 
costs that are involved in exchanges or transactions, other than the sale price, in other words, all the 
costs that are not directly related to the production of that product (Nilsson and Sundqvist, 2007, 
Webster and Lai, 2003). Although many authors have discussed this concept, consensus about the 
definition of transaction costs has not been achieved and, moreover, there are many inconsistencies 
amongst them. The concept has been used in different meanings and scopes, from, being simply, the 
fee charged by middlemen, to a much broader concept which can be applied in comparing efficiency 
of different alternatives of resource allocation (Klaes, 2008). Transaction costs are also defined as ‘the 
cost of exchanging ownership titles’ (Demsetz, 1969) or ‘the costs of effecting exchange’ (Barzel, 
1985). In another definition, Gordon (1994) determines the expenses of organising and participating 
in a market or implementing a government policy as transaction costs. 
McCann et al. (2005, p.530) review a range of transaction costs definitions and present a 
definition to be used in environmental management: “transaction costs are the resources used to 
define, establish, maintain, and transfer property rights.” However, Marshall (2013) argues that this 
definition is not sufficiently comprehensive. He points out that McCann et al.’s (2005) definition 
considers the costs of defining the problem (to be solved institutionally) as negligible costs. On the 
other hand, property rights do not cover all the institutions which are involved in transaction costs of 
environmental policy and management. In addition, there is no clear distinction between the creation 
or change of an institution or organisation and the use of them (Furubotn and Richter, 1991). 
Similarly, North (1990) explains that institutions are created to reduce uncertainties, or are changed to 
facilitate a socially preferable outcome, after which they are used. Therefore, this study will use more 
comprehensive definition of transaction costs, presented by Marshall (2013, p.188) : 
“Transaction costs are the costs of the resources used: to define, establish, maintain, use and 
change institutions and organisations; and to define the problems that these institutions and 
organisations are intended to solve.” 
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3. Factors Influencing Transaction Costs in Land-Use Policy Instruments 
Many factors have been shown to influence transaction costs in different policy areas, such as 
environmental, agricultural, and natural resource policies. In the land-use planning literature, Shahab 
et al. (2018a) advances a transaction costs framework for evaluating land-use policy instruments 
building on prior works of inter alia Coggan et al. (2013), McCann (2013), Ducos and Dupraz (2007), 
Ducos et al. (2009), Mettepenningen et al. (2011), Nilsson (2009), Knowler and Bradshaw (2007), 
Rørstad et al. (2007). This framework employs the terminology commonly used in transaction costs 
economics, particularly the works of Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson (1975, 1981, 1985, 1996, 
1998, 2000), for example asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. As outlined in Table 1, they 
propose that the factors that influence transaction costs in the design and implementation of land-use 
planning policy instruments can be classified in three categories; 1) characteristics of the transaction; 
2) characteristics of the transactors; and 3) characteristics of the policy. The main contribution of this 
framework, compared to the previous ones, is that it includes a policy-characteristics category to 
highlight the importance of characteristics of the policy itself in the design and implementation of any 
policy. This framework is used in this paper to examine the factors which influence transaction costs 
in TDR programmes. While these transaction costs influencing factors are presented separately, it 
should be noted that they might be interrelated. 
 
Table 1: Factors influencing transaction costs in a land use policy instrument 
Categories Factors Description 
Transaction 
characteristics 
Interdependence (asset specificity) The degree to which the investments are specific to a particular transaction and re-deployable to other transactions. 
Uncertainty surrounding transactions A situation which involves limited information and/or asymmetric information. 
Timing (duration and frequency) The number of transactions that occurs in a period of time, as well as the length of time each transaction takes. 
Number of agents The number of stakeholders and people that are involved in a transaction. 
Involvement of intermediaries Intermediaries might be involved in transactions and they may play an important role by providing information and other services. 
Transactor 
characteristics 
Past experience Concerns previous experiences of agents with transactions or policies, and it may have a ‘learning by doing’ effect. 
Opportunism 
When the agents involved in transactions show rent-seeking 
behaviour and adapt their actions to take advantage of opportunities 
for their own self-interests. 
Trust between parties The extent to which agents have confidence in the information provided by other agents and their actions. 
Common preferences Common ideology as well as a good understanding among people about the objectives and approaches of a policy. 
Social connectedness The membership of a community of practice which is a group of people who share a domain of interest. 
Policy 
characteristics 
Simplicity The extent to which a policy is easy to participate and understand, and how simple the policy administration is designed. 
Age of the policy The number of years that a policy is in place. 
Precision of the policy Concerns how precisely a policy is designed and structured. 
Policy approach Different policy approaches (i.e. regulatory and market-based) within different types of governance (i.e. market and hierarchy). 
Public involvement and participation The extent to which the public has been involved, and participated in, the policy choice, design and implementation stages. 
Policy credibility and consistency The quality that people are confident that rules, regulations, and policies will be carried out and are not going to change easily. 
Source: Shahab et al. (2018a) 
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4. Methodology 
This research has utilised a case-study approach in order to examine the factors influencing 
transaction costs in TDR programmes. The case study, as a research method, is a well-established 
technique in the field of land-use planning. The ability of the case study methodology to be utilised, in 
learning about, obtaining data, understanding phenomena and processes in local contexts, and 
integrating multiple methods, makes it a powerful research method in land-use planning (Thomas and 
Bertolini, 2014, Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002, Yin, 2013, Marshall and Rossman, 2006). The case 
studies in this research have been selected from the TDR programmes of Maryland, USA. Maryland is 
one of the pioneer states in operationalising these programmes (McConnell et al., 2007, Dehart and 
Etgen, 2007). Some of the TDR programmes in Maryland are among the most successful, well-
established, and well-institutionalised programmes in the USA. According to a national study, 
conducted by American Farmland Trust (2008), TDR programmes in Maryland had preserved over 
80,000 acres, or 61% of all agricultural lands protected by TDR transfers in the nation. Four TDR 
programmes in Maryland have been selected as the case studies of this research, including Calvert, 
Montgomery, St. Mary’s, and Charles Counties. Table 2 outlines the characteristics of these four TDR 
programmes. Montgomery County is the most populous county among the case studies, and as it is 
located relatively closer to Washington D.C., its housing market is more active, facing higher demand 
for development. Despite similarities, the design and implementation of these TDR programmes are 
different in many respects. They vary in terms of: their approaches to the designation of sending and 
receiving areas; what the eligibility criteria for TDR creation/retirement are; whether the use of 
purchased TDRs in the receiving areas is by-right; and what mechanisms are used to stabilise TDR 
prices. Moreover, these four TDR programmes vary in terms of the perceived degree of success and 
the year of initiation. Calvert and Montgomery Counties, which initiated in 1978 and 1980 
respectively, have been quite successful in preserving farmlands and open spaces in the regions they 
have identified for protection. On the other hand, St. Mary’s and Charles Counties, which were 
initiated in 1990s, have not been very (or relatively) successful and have preserved limited amount of 
lands (McConnell et al., 2007).  
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the TDR case studies 
TDR 
Programmes 
Year 
Initiated 
County 
Pop. 
(2010) 
County 
Area 
(Sq. 
Miles) 
Acres 
Preserved 
(2016) 
Type of 
protection 
Acres 
needed 
for one 
TDR 
No. of TDRs 
needed to 
build one 
unit 
Main Goal of 
the TDR 
Program 
Calvert 
County 1978 88,737 213.15 14,700 Easement 1 5 
Preserving the 
rural character 
and farmlands 
Montgomery 
County 1980 971,777 491.25 52,052 Easement 5 1 
Agricultural 
preservation & 
compensation 
St. Mary’s 
County 1990 105,151 357.18 4,107 Easement 3 1 
Preserving 
natural 
resources & 
farmlands 
Charles 
County 1992 146,551 457.75 5,274 Covenant 3 1 
Agricultural 
preservation 
Data sources: Pruetz (2016); Maryland Department of Planning (2016); Dehart and Etgen (2007); The 
Maryland State Data Center (2015) 
 
As presented in Table 3, representatives from different parties involved in the TDR transactions 
in each TDR case study were interviewed. Four different parties were identified to be involved in 
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most of the TDR transactions, including landowners/farmers (TDR sellers – supply side), developers 
(TDR buyers – demand side), local authorities (planners, programme administrators and/or people 
who work for the county government), and intermediaries (land-use attorneys and brokers). 
Interviews are considered as one of the major data collection methods in transaction costs economics 
studies (McCann et al., 2005, Falconer and Saunders, 2002, Fang et al., 2005, Kuperan et al., 2008, 
McCann and Easter, 2000, Ofei-Mensah and Bennett, 2013, Coggan et al., 2013, Mettepenningen et 
al., 2011). Using open-ended questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
participants of four TDR programmes in Maryland from March to July 2016. The semi-structured 
interviews provided the researchers with the flexibility to tailor the questions to the interview context 
and interviewees’ experiences and positions (May, 2011, Galletta, 2013). Open-ended questions were 
designed based on the transaction costs economics literature in order to address the theory-based 
factors (as presented in Table 1) influencing transaction costs in TDR programmes. A total of 46 
participants have been interviewed in order to reach data saturation, whereby no further insights were 
being generated from data collection (Guest et al., 2006). This research aimed at achieving data 
saturation concerning each factor influencing transaction costs across TDR case studies, but not 
necessarily in each case study. 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face and at a location and time that was convenient for 
the interviewees, however, two interviews were conducted by telephone, as this was the preference of 
the interviewees. All of the interviews, lasting from 45 to 90 minutes each, were digitally recorded 
and anonymously transcribed by the researchers. In order to choose the potential interviewees, in the 
first instance, key interviewees who were involved in the respective TDR programme were identified, 
contacted and interviewed. Then, based on snowball sampling, they were asked to recommend other 
potential interviewees and/or to provide information helpful for contacting other members of the 
target population. Snowball sampling allowed us to identify people who were information-rich yet not 
easy to identify and contact (Sarantakos, 2012, Thompson, 2012). To examine whether, and how, the 
theory-based factors, presented in Table 1, influence transaction costs, each interview question was 
designed to theoretically relate to one or more factors. For example, to address an aspect of 
interdependence (asset specificity) from the perspective of local authorities, they were asked: Are 
there standardised processes and documents for those requiring or selling the development rights? If 
they were involved in the implementation/administration of another TDR scheme they were asked 
whether they think it would be easier and why? Such interview design enabled the researchers not 
only to manage the collected data case-by-case, but also to organise the empirical data according to 
the variables of interest (i.e. the theory-based factors) (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Using NVivo 11, 
interviews were analysed and coded based on the theory-based factors. Policy documents were also 
reviewed for required data, including original reports of the policy instruments, official statistics, 
administrative records, and other accounts kept routinely by the county authorities which enhanced 
our framing of the questions and the discussion. 
 
Table 3: Number of different stakeholders interviewed in each TDR case study 
Participants Montgomery County 
Calvert 
County 
St. Mary’s 
County 
Charles 
County Total 
Landowners 3 2 2 2 9 
Developers 3 2 2 2 9 
Local Authorities 5 5 4 2 16 
Intermediaries 4 2 4 2 12 
Total 46 
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5. Results: Factors Influencing Transaction Costs in TDR Programmes 
Using the analytical framework of Table 1, this section presents an analysis of the factors 
influencing transaction costs in TDR programmes, based on the interviews with key interviewees 
from across the four TDR case studies. Each factor is examined to find out whether, and how, it 
influences transaction costs in these TDR programmes. This section also highlights the different 
effects of these transaction costs’ factors among the parties involved and across the TDR case studies. 
 
5.1. Factors concerning the characteristics of the transaction 
 
5.1.1. Interdependence (Asset Specificity) 
TDR is not an ‘idiosyncratic’ good, but a nonspecific one. Regardless of its origin, once 
created, it equals to any other TDR in the market. In other words, the price of TDR is not dependent 
on the attributes of the land in which the TDR is originated, such as the land use, the soil quality, the 
location, etc. Every single TDR available in the market at one time should theoretically have the same 
price. Thus, concerning a TDR as a commodity, a TDR transaction is of low interdependence. This 
attribute of TDR reduces transaction costs through decreasing information collection costs as well as 
making negotiation and finalising a price for the TDR a relatively straightforward effort. Likewise, it 
reduces the time and effort that local authorities need to put into reviewing and assessing a TDR 
application. While it makes the bargaining power of the sellers of TDRs limited, the buyers see that as 
one of the major strengths of the TDR programme. For example, one of the developers in St. Mary’s 
County pointed out: 
“A TDR is a TDR, why would I pay any more. The negotiation over price was very 
straightforward and the reason was because a TDR is a TDR. There's no other criteria. It's not like a 
Chevrolet versus a Ford or an uptown location versus a downtown location. That's not even like a 
bottle of water. You and I could have different brands of water, then I could say my water is better 
and we can have a conversation about it. On the TDR, there's no conversation. You either have it or 
you don't.” 
In order to create or certify TDRs, the landowners have to do a property title search, and 
sometimes a land survey, as part of the counties’ rules and requirements. Although in most cases these 
goods and services have been only purchased for the TDR transaction, they could be re-deployed to 
other transactions and purposes, and are not fully specific to a particular TDR transaction. Thus, while 
the landowners are required to invest in preparing title reports, and sometimes land surveys, these 
goods and services should not be considered as investment in completely ‘dedicated assets’ from their 
perspective. However, if based on the agreement between seller and buyer, the buyer has to pay for 
the costs of title search and land survey and they will be considered as dedicated assets for the buyer, 
since he or she will not be able to use them in any other transaction. 
In terms of site specificity, there is a difference between the supply and demand sides of the 
TDR market. TDRs are lifted from lands located in preservation districts (i.e. sending areas), and are 
landed in areas designated and specific for development (i.e. receiving areas). Due to designating 
large areas in each county as sending areas, TDRs are quite a widespread good and are not site 
specific from a TDR supply point of view. However, since in some counties, the TDR supply capacity 
is greater than the TDR demand capacity, using TDRs in receiving areas is site specific to some 
extent. This situation has been pointed out particularly by interviewees in Montgomery County, where 
the use of TDRs in receiving areas is not ‘by-right’ and might require further processes. Developers in 
Montgomery County were required to negotiate with the County planners as well as conducting 
public hearings in order to use bonus densities derived from purchased TDR credits. Moreover, 
transferring extra densities to the receiving areas might face with reluctance among citizens of those 
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areas. Additional rules and regulations concerning the use of TDRs in receiving areas have also been 
mentioned as another obstacle. For example, one of the county administrators in Montgomery County 
stated that: 
“One of the problems with the programme is having this quotient of supply and demand that's 
imbalanced. In theory, you should have one place to land, for each TDR that you intend to create. 
However, the problem with a lot of these TDR receiving areas is that they have a theoretical capacity, 
which is different with their practical capacity. Due to the environmental regulations, topography, 
environmental law, and competing uses for TDRs, what ends up happening is most of these receiving 
areas only get to be at the maximum about 60% of what they are planned for.” 
All of the counties have established standardised documents, routines and processes, which are 
tailored to be used for TDR transactions. There are four main documents involved in any TDR 
transaction, including TDR certificate, easement or covenant, deed of transfer, and TDR sale contract. 
The first three documents are designed as ‘boilerplate’ documents which are public and usually can be 
found on the counties’ websites, but the last document, TDR sale contract, is a private document only 
between transactors. Nonetheless, land-use attorneys involved in TDR transactions have developed 
sample documents to be used for different TDR sale contracts. Thus, TDR transactions have very low 
level of procedural asset specificity which means routines and template documents can be easily 
transferred to another transaction. The interviewees also noted that the institutional knowledge of 
carrying out one TDR transaction is transferable to the next transactions which shows they are of low 
knowledge specificity. This attribute of TDR transactions will be further discussed with regard to the 
transactors’ past experiences factor later in this section. 
 
5.1.2. Uncertainty 
The TDR prices are set by the private market. Depending on changes in the development 
market, the TDR prices have fluctuated in all four case-study programmes during the last few 
decades. For example, the Montgomery County TDR programme has experienced a TDR price as low 
as $6,500 per TDR in 2001, while five years later, in 2006, the price was as high as $42,000 per TDR. 
Similarly, in Charles County, although the TDR price has had a peak of $20,000 in 2006, in recent 
months it has been as low as $5,500 per TDR. These dramatic changes in the TDR prices have had 
major effects on the uncertainties over the TDR transactions. The counties use different mechanisms 
to try to stabilise TDR prices and reduce their related uncertainties by making them more predictable. 
Montgomery and Calvert Counties established PDR programmes, respectively, in 1990 and 1993, 
more than 10 years after their TDR programmes began. Recently, Charles County has also started 
introducing a PDR programme, accepting PDR applications in 2016 for the first time. On the other 
hand, since 2002, St. Mary’s County has used a fee-in-lieu programme as an alternative to purchasing 
a TDR. Through the use of PDR, which uses public-fund sources, the counties buy development 
rights directly from the landowners. PDR provides landowners with another alternative to preserve 
their lands. Nonetheless, this option is not necessarily available when landowners are willing to sell 
their development rights. While the purchase price of PDR is dependent on past TDR market prices, it 
also influences future TDR transactions. According to McConnell et al. (2007), using PDR, as a 
complementary programme, in Calvert County has made the TDR prices very stable, whereby it has 
created a predictable environment for TDR sellers and buyers. In addition, Calvert County was the 
only county which had been publishing a quarterly newsletter, including TDR price information that 
contributed to the predictability of the TDR market in this county. However, arising from changes in 
management and administration, this newsletter is no longer published. The Fee-in-Lieu Programme 
in St. Mary’s County, on the other hand, has been established as a complementary mechanism for 
TDR to ensure that, should there not be enough TDRs available in the market, a developer would be 
able to pay a fee to the County to buy the required density. The Fee-in-lieu for each TDR must be at 
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least 120% of the average market value of TDRs purchased in arms-length intermediate transactions 
in the previous fiscal year. 
For the TDR sellers, uncertainties concern when and how to participate in the TDR programme, 
what the current TDR sale price is, the results of past TDR transactions, and how to find a TDR 
buyer. One of the farmers interviewed in Calvert County stated that “the TDR market is very fickle. 
Sometimes there is a real market for it and sometimes years will go by and there is no market for it.” 
The landowners who decide to participate in the TDR programme are highly uncertain regarding 
when is the best time to sell the TDRs. This links to the volatility aspect of uncertainty. Moreover, the 
sellers of TDRs do not have enough information about the prices at which TDRs are being bought and 
sold, which links to the ambiguity aspect of uncertainty. None of the counties collect and release 
information on sale prices or about potential buyers of TDRs, with landowners indicating that they 
rely on ‘word of mouth’ from their personal connections. These uncertainties have a considerable 
effect on the transaction costs of TDR sellers in all TDR case studies. For the buyers of TDRs, 
uncertainty associated with a TDR transaction is lower, compared to those of TDR sellers. The 
developers, interested in purchasing TDRs, are usually provided with a list of potential sellers, whom 
they can contact with and negotiate a price. Moreover, they normally have more information 
regarding TDR transactions, prices, and processes, due to their personal experiences and connections. 
For local authorities, uncertainty over the TDR programmes concerns two main issues; 
information about TDR prices and the outcomes of the programme. Being aware of TDR prices in the 
market enables the local authorities to provide more precise information to the sellers and buyers, to 
assess the condition of the programme, and to set a reasonable price/fee for the PDR/fee-in-lieu 
programme. The sale price of a TDR transaction is set privately between a buyer and a seller and the 
local authorities are not necessarily informed about that. In Charles County, for example, the 
administrators often see a $1 price on the deed of transfer document, instead of the real sale price, 
since some of the transactors are not willing to disclose the prices. For the programme administrators, 
this situation increases uncertainty about TDR prices in the market. On the other hand, the outcomes 
of TDR programmes are uncertain to the planners, since they have no control on targeting the number 
and quality of the lands that enter into the programme. Participating in the programmes is voluntary, 
and the planners cannot easily estimate the acreage of land that may become preserved each year. 
Also, there is a concern regarding the ability of the programme in preserving the high-quality 
farmlands. Unlike PDR programmes, using TDR programmes planners cannot prioritise purchasing 
the development rights of prime farmlands or any other selected environmentally sensitive lands 
within sending areas. As one of the representatives of a local authority in Calvert County said, “You 
might end up preserving low quality farms.” In summary, it is clear that uncertainty is one of the 
major factors influencing transaction costs in the TDR programmes for all the parties involved. 
 
5.1.3. Timing 
Timing consists of two aspects of frequency and duration. In terms of the former, frequent TDR 
transactions reduce transaction costs by reducing uncertainty over TDR prices and decreasing 
information collection time. On the contrary, few and infrequent TDR transactions result in instability 
of TDR prices and increased levels of uncertainty associated with them. With frequent TDR 
transactions, transaction costs of the local authorities would tend to be reduced, since it enables them 
to develop standardised routines and processes and template documents. It also helps them to re-
deploy the knowledge to limit the time required for each TDR transaction. Sellers and buyers, on the 
other hand, would benefit from increased predictability and stability of market prices arising from 
frequent TDR transactions. It also increases the availability and accessibility of the information for all 
parties. The markets for TDRs in the case study programmes are generally thin. These thin markets, 
which are characterized by a small number of participants and few buying or selling offers for TDRs, 
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contribute to the low transaction frequency, high price volatility, and relative illiquidity of TDRs. The 
frequency of TDR transactions depends on different factors, including the market conditions, policy 
design, and the development approaches and priorities of the counties. The more developments take 
place in an area, the more TDR transactions occur. For example, all counties were experiencing a 
greater number of transactions before 2008/09, when the recession started in the USA. Furthermore, 
counties have different approaches and priorities regarding development. St. Mary’s, Calvert, and 
Charles counties use the TDR programme, as their primary preservation scheme, to encourage 
development in their receiving areas. Montgomery County, on the other hand, provides the developers 
with a few other options to increase density without purchasing TDRs. 
The duration of a TDR transaction can be defined as the time required to complete a 
transaction. This duration varies across transactions, depending on the market conditions and past 
experiences of the transactors. From the TDR sellers’ standpoint, TDR transactions are single and 
independent transactions, concerning a stand-alone product, called a TDR. Therefore, they are not 
involved in any other follow-up activities or long-standing consequences. When a landowner sells his 
certified TDRs, upon its sale no more action is required. This attribute of TDR reduces the time 
required for a transaction to be completed. Moreover, the whole process of participating in the TDR 
programmes is normally shorter than for other preservation schemes. For example, one of the 
programme administrators in Montgomery County pointed out that “for the TDR programme, from 
the time that you apply to get the TDR created to the time you record your easement, you are talking 
about one to two months. But for other programmes, like PDR, it's going to be from six to 18 months. 
They are lengthier processes.” Likewise, a farmer in St. Mary’s County stated that “you could have 
TDRs lifted off of a property in a month or maybe 45 days”. However, given the TDR markets are thin 
and rather illiquid, finding a buyer for TDRs can be the challenging part of the process for the TDR 
sellers. Depending on the market conditions and expecting sale price, it might take few days, months, 
or even years. 
For TDR buyers, on the other hand, the process is usually more straightforward than for sellers. 
After finding a seller and finalising a contract, developers have to record a deed of transfer in the land 
records and submit it to the county to be used in their development projects. The whole process can 
take from only a few days to a number of weeks. All interviewed developers stated that finding a TDR 
seller was not a time-consuming process. Besides using their own personal connections and contacts, 
the county authorities provided them with a list of potential TDR sellers. In addition, as discussed 
before, negotiation over a price for TDR is a more or less straightforward effort, since TDR is a 
nonspecific good. For instance, one of the developers in Charles County mentioned that: 
“If they [TDRs] have already been lifted off the property, I could buy them tomorrow. That 
would be very quick. I've been doing this business for many years so I know a lot of folks and I know 
who's got TDRs and who doesn't. The County also keeps a list of people who have notified them that 
they have TDRs for sale. I can call any one of these guys. If I'm willing to pay their price, I can have 
them tomorrow”. 
 
5.1.4. Number of Agents and Involvement of Intermediaries 
Along with sellers and buyers of TDRs, a number of other people might be involved in a TDR 
transaction, including programme administrators, county attorneys, land-use attorneys, and brokers. 
Counties typically assign TDR administration responsibilities to two people; one person is responsible 
for initial consultation with landowners, reviewing TDR applications, and creating TDRs; another 
person is at the receiving side of it and is responsible for approving extra densities to be used in 
receiving areas. With the exception of Charles County, county attorneys are also involved in the TDR 
programmes. County attorneys legally review and approve documents in order to create or certify 
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TDRs. In the case of Charles County, instead of the county attorney, the programme administrator 
carries out this task. Having fewer people involved in the process has decreased the administration 
time and costs required for TDR programme in Charles County. However, this effect has not been 
substantial. 
There are land-use attorneys in all counties who have been involved in several TDR 
transactions. Involvement of land-use attorneys in TDR transactions is necessary, as preparing a title 
report for a property is required by counties and it has to be completed by a licenced attorney. Along 
with the title report, land-use attorneys provide their clients with advice regarding TDR transactions, 
such as legal requirements, processes, documentations, and sometimes TDR prices and potential 
sellers/buyers. Through capitalising on economies of scale, these land-use attorneys have developed 
institutional knowledge that is transferable between TDR transactions, given the fact that these 
transactions are of low knowledge specificity. Due to land-use attorneys’ experiences across many 
TDR transactions over time, the costs associated with information collection for both sellers and 
buyers of TDRs are reduced. Therefore, while entailing professional fee costs for the parties, the 
involvement of these land-use attorneys, who specialise in working with TDR programmes, reduces 
other transaction costs of the trading parties. 
The involvement of brokers in TDR transactions mainly depends on the market conditions and 
availability of information regarding TDR sellers/buyers. Uncertainty about finding a TDR buyer has 
been the key reason for the use of brokers by TDR sellers. For instance, among the landowners 
interviewed in Montgomery County, one person, who completed his TDR transaction in 2003 when 
the housing market was active, could find the buyer and complete the transaction without the need to 
involve a broker. On the other hand, two interviewees, who completed their TDR transactions after 
2012, had to pay 3-5% of the total TDR sales as the brokerage commission for finding the TDR 
buyers. Due to the lower demand for TDRs after the recession, they could not reach potential buyers 
by themselves. While involvement of the brokers in TDR transactions might shorten the time required 
to complete a transaction, it notably increases the overall transaction costs of the TDR sellers. 
 
5.2. Factors concerning the characteristics of the transactor 
 
5.2.1. Past experience 
All developers who were interviewed stated that they have been involved in a number of TDR 
transactions since the programmes were initiated. Therefore, they had previous experiences with TDR 
transactions before undertaking their most recent transaction. They noted that these past experiences 
reduce the time and effort they had to invest in each transaction. On the other hand, only three 
landowner interviewees had previous experiences with TDR programmes. These landowners 
highlighted that their past experiences limit information collection requirements for the TDR 
transaction, and consequently reduce transaction costs. All interviewed landowners noted that their 
current experience with TDR transactions would have a downward influence on time and effort of 
their future TDR transactions. Many of their TDR transactions have been undertaken with the 
involvement of intermediaries, who specialised in these programmes. These intermediaries provide 
buyers and sellers with advice on the TDR processes, based on their past experiences. Similarly, local 
authorities in all counties acknowledged that, through a ‘learning by doing’ effect, their past 
experiences help them to accomplish their tasks in a more efficient way. This attribute of TDR 
transaction can also be justified according to its low degree of knowledge specificity and 
transferability of institutional knowledge from one transaction to another, which we discussed earlier. 
 
5.2.2. Opportunism 
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Uncertainty is the primary factor that facilitates opportunism in TDR transactions. Some 
interviewed landowners stated that because of the uncertainties over finding a buyer, developers and 
brokers sometimes show secretive and opportunistic behaviours. Reluctance by buyers to disclose 
TDR agreed sale prices is also mentioned by local authority respondents in Charles County. These 
opportunistic behaviours are mainly associated with withholding important market information from 
other parties involved. Some landowners also believe that some people in the counties have a better 
access to information and this information asymmetry increases the risk of opportunism. For instance, 
one of the landowners in Montgomery County pointed out that: 
“The TDR market is very opaque... There are only really a pretty small number of developers 
and builders in the marketplace. So they almost function as an oligopolist. It's not a free market at all. 
Those are the people with the money. I would have a feeling that they do talk. But on the farm end of 
it, you're pretty much in the dark about it.” 
This attribute of TDR transactions increases transaction costs for TDR sellers and local 
authorities through increasing their information collection time. On the other hand, TDR sellers could 
potentially be opportunistic in their transactions, by providing incomplete information to the parties 
involved. However, this opportunism has been overcome through administrative design requirements 
(i.e. property title report and land survey) for certifying TDRs. This potential for opportunism has 
increased the transaction costs of local authorities due to the administration costs and time needed to 
review and verify TDR applications. Moreover, there is a potential for speculators to purchase and 
hold TDRs, at their own financial risk, with the hope that they will become more valuable in future. 
However, it was not mentioned as big issue in any of the TDR case studies. 
 
5.2.3. Trust between parties 
Landowners in all counties acknowledged that they had confidence in the information and 
advice that the programme administrators and land-use attorneys provided to them. Social 
connectedness and past experiences of working with county officials have been identified as two 
major factors to have positive influences on trust building between the landowners and administrators. 
This confidence has decreased the transaction costs of landowners through decreasing the information 
collection time and effort. On the other hand, some developers expressed a general pessimism 
regarding the government and public policies. Nevertheless, since TDR transactions and negotiations 
have been completed between private parties, with minimal involvement of the county governments, 
this lack of confidence does not seem to have a considerable effect on transaction costs of developers. 
In other words, due to the market-based nature of the TDR transactions, developers’ interactions with 
programme administrators have been minimal and limited to verifying and including purchased TDRs 
into the development projects and subdivisions. Moreover, involvement of intermediaries, such as 
land-use attorneys with experience of TDR transactions, increases confidence in the information 
shared between parties and reduces information collection activities. 
 
5.2.4. Common preferences 
While all interviewed landowners in the four counties believed that there is a need to protect 
farmlands in their counties, they mentioned financial motivations as their main reason for 
participating in the TDR programme. Only two landowners stated that land preservation was of equal 
importance for them in selling the TDRs of their property. Likewise, the main motivation for the 
developers in purchasing TDRs was to develop at a higher density than is otherwise allowed by the 
base zoning, and, therefore, to profit financially. Thus, apart from financial motivation, we did not 
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find evidence that common preferences have a considerable influence on the transaction costs of TDR 
programmes. 
 
5.2.5. Social connectedness 
Membership of communities of practice have had a considerable decreasing influence on the 
transaction costs of parties involved in TDR transactions. Among the interviewed landowners and 
developers, those who have been a member of different organisations and/or committees highlighted 
the importance of this influence in decreasing the time and effort needed for information collection 
activities. They found that these memberships raised their awareness regarding the policy options, in 
general, and the TDR programme, in particular. This social connectedness also contributed to trust 
building between the TDR buyers, sellers, and administrators. More importantly, it decreased the time 
and costs of finding a buyer for TDR sellers through developing their connections and networks. For 
example, one of the landowners in Calvert County pointed out that she found a buyer for the TDRs of 
her property, using the connections established at the Calvert County Farm Bureau. 
 
5.3. Factors concerning the characteristics of the policy 
 
5.3.1. Simplicity 
The influence of the simplicity of policy design and administration on transaction costs was 
mentioned by TDR sellers, buyers, and programme administrators. Some landowners found the TDR 
administration process relatively simple and clear, whereas others stated that the process was 
complex. For TDR sellers, these complexities were mainly associated with the administration 
requirements and finding buyers for TDRs. Some difficulties, such as legal issues with property title 
reports and objections of mortgage lenders to sell TDRs, might arise in preparing TDR applications. 
Moreover, requiring a land survey for TDR applications has added to the difficulties, time, and 
complexities of TDR transactions in all counties, with the exception of St. Mary’s County. In an 
attempt to simplify the institutional design and arrangement of their TDR programme, in 2006, St. 
Mary’s County modified it by removing a land survey as a TDR administration requirement. Prior to 
these modifications, landowners who wanted to sell their TDRs had to prepare ‘a very expensive’ 
survey to determine the exact acreage of the property1. One of the developers in St. Mary’s County, 
who was a member of the taskforce reviewing the TDR programme in 2006, highlighted that 
simplifying the process was one of the main reasons for the policy modifications. He pointed out that: 
“It [the TDR program] was so complicated and so cumbersome for people to lift them [TDRs] 
off their property. And the landowners were not interested in a too complicated and too expensive 
system. So, we tried to simplify the process of certifying and removing TDRs from property.” 
In all counties, except Charles County, the number of TDRs that can be lifted (i.e. created) from land 
in sending areas would be calculated only based on its acreage, which decreases the ambiguity and 
complexity of the programme. However, in Charles County, for land in sending areas to be eligible to 
participate in the TDR programme, it requires the achievement of certain size, soil, and location 
criteria. This extra layer of regulation increases transaction costs of the local authorities by increasing 
the time and effort that they have to put in assessing a TDR application. Similarly, it increases 
transaction costs of the landowners by increasing uncertainties, transaction time, and information 
collection costs. On the other hand, while developers found the development project processes highly 
complicated and difficult, they stated that the TDR process was relatively simple. The developers 
                                                     
1 . The cost of preparing a land survey is normally within the range of $10,000-$15,000, as of June 2016. 
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were faced with difficulties regarding the development requirements and restrictions, and the policy 
choices to increase densities. The influence of simplicity on the implementation of policy instruments, 
such as TDR programmes, is discussed in both transaction costs (Pannell et al., 2013) and TDR 
(Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002) literature, by which they concluded that simplicity is an important 
aspect of any successful policy instrument. 
5.3.2. Age of the policy 
All the TDR case studies considered in this paper were designed and initiated a few decades 
ago. The age of the policy is also described by interviewees as an influencing factor on transaction 
costs of TDR programmes. It has had a downward impact on these costs in different ways. First, the 
age of the TDR programmes has raised public awareness and knowledge regarding the policy. One of 
the programme administrators in St. Mary’s County stated that “after more than 25 years of having 
this programme being administered, it’s fairly well-known for everyone what the process is.” Second, 
by being actively utilised in the counties, the length of time the TDR programmes have been in place 
has increased the policy credibility and consistency, as well as the trust between parties involved. 
Third, ageing of the programmes has provided the local authorities with an opportunity to improve 
institutional design and arrangement of the policy. Based on the programme reviews and assessments, 
all counties have made some major changes in the programmes. One of the interviewees, who was 
involved in the design of the Calvert County TDR programme, believed that “the programme has 
evolved very much over the years.” Similarly, one of the programme administrators in Charles County 
found “the TDR programme very mature, since it's been around for a long time.” Finally, it has 
contributed to enhanced institutional knowledge on the part of the programme administrators. One of 
the programme administrators in St. Mary’s County pointed out that “every now and then some new 
issues may arise, and you would learn how to deal with them in future.” However, they highlighted 
that the institutional knowledge of the experienced programme administrators has to be transferred to 
the new administrators, otherwise, ‘that knowledge would be lost.’  
 
5.3.3. Precision of the policy 
Precision of the policy design has also influenced transaction costs in the TDR programmes. 
This influence was mainly associated with the designation of sending and receiving areas. The TDR 
case studies adopted different strategies regarding sending and receiving areas, according to the 
political acceptability and different priorities of the counties. In the Montgomery County TDR 
programme, sending areas and receiving areas were precisely specified at the outset of the policy, 
whereby the process of reviewing TDR applications have become a straightforward effort for the 
programme administrators. Landowners and developers also appeared to have sufficient information 
regarding the location of these areas. The Calvert County TDR programme, on the other hand, was 
initially designed with a lower degree of precision regarding both sending and receiving areas, such 
that, there are areas which can be both TDR sending and receiving areas. Developing land using 
TDRs in Calvert County required a resolution of approval by the board of county commissioners. As 
one of the programme administrators pointed out, “TDR applications had to be reviewed on a case by 
case, land by land, parcel by parcel basis, which were too cumbersome.” In Charles County, while 
area in the north of the county are designated as receiving areas, all areas outside of this development 
district can send TDRs, subject to meeting certain size, soil and location criteria. Therefore, the 
programme was designed with greater precision regarding the receiving areas, compared to sending 
areas. Unlike Charles County, the St. Mary’s TDR programme designated specific sending areas (i.e. 
Rural Preservation District (RPD)), but the entire county is a receiving area. While designating more 
precise TDR sending and receiving areas might increase the transaction costs associated with policy 
design, it can decrease the transaction costs of policy implementation and administration. However, 
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greater precision of policy design is not always possible due to constraints imposed by political 
acceptability. 
 
5.3.4. Policy approach 
The policy approach has had a considerable influence on both the size and distribution of the 
transaction costs among the parties involved in TDR transactions. In order to understand the influence 
of the policy approach, TDR, as a market-based policy instrument, will be compared to its regulatory 
counterpart, PDR. While they more or less have the same policy objectives, they use different 
approaches to achieve their goals. From the perspective of the local authorities, the transaction costs 
of PDR transactions are greater than those of TDR. In a PDR transaction, local authorities are 
required to conduct substantial information collection activities, since they need to decide which 
properties’ development rights should be purchased and at what price. A programme administrator in 
Montgomery County stated that he spends at least one month per year in information collection 
activities related to the PDR transactions. However, in a TDR transaction, it is left to the market (i.e. 
self-interest of the agents) to set the price and location of TDRs. Moreover, through using market 
signals and mechanisms, TDR programmes minimise the need for interactions between programme 
administrators and TDR sellers/buyers. Therefore, the time and effort that has to be invested in a 
transaction is less in TDR programmes. Similarly, from the developers’ standpoint, the transaction 
costs of buying TDRs in a competitive market are fewer than other alternatives associated with 
gaining extra density, which are normally associated with lengthy and time-consuming regulatory 
processes. However, since the transaction costs of TDR sellers vary greatly from one transaction to 
another, such comparison cannot be made. As discussed before, the transaction costs of landowners 
depend highly on the market conditions, by which, with high demand for TDRs in an active market, 
these costs will be fewer. On the other hand, in a low-demand condition, in order to find a buyer, a 
landowner has to wait for long time and/or pay a brokerage fee. In the latter case, the transaction costs 
of participating in the TDR programmes can be greater than those of other regulatory alternatives, 
such as PDR and state/county preservation easements programmes. 
 
5.3.5. Public involvement and participation 
Participation of the stakeholders at the policy choice, design, and implementation has had both 
upward and downward influences on the transaction costs of the TDR programmes (Morrison et al., 
2008, Mettepenningen et al., 2011, McCann, 2013). While public participation can increase 
transaction costs of the policy-choice and policy-design processes, it can reduce the transaction costs 
of the policy implementation (Coggan et al., 2010). Unlike Montgomery County, where the TDR 
programme has been established by the county authorities aiming to compensate the landowners 
affected by downzoning, in Calvert County, the TDR programme has been proposed by the farming 
community. In order to find alternative land-preservation tools for the county, a committee of the 
farmers was established in 1976. Several meetings with farmers and other stakeholders were 
undertaken. Finally, at a meeting with more than 65 people, the committee presented six preservation 
options and asked people to vote. ‘Seventy-five percent of the hands said let’s try the TDR’. 
According to one of the committee members, this bottom-up approach has not only built trust, but 
also raised public awareness and social connectedness among the stakeholders of the TDR 
programme. Moreover, it helped the local authorities in Calvert County face less resistance in 
implementing the TDR programme, in comparison to Montgomery TDR programme. In particular, 
this resistance has been related to large-scale downzoning and allowing extra densities in receiving 
areas. For example, in Calvert County, downzoning was not ‘politically acceptable’ at the outset of 
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the programme. In Montgomery County, on the other hand, the existing residents of some receiving 
areas refused to accept additional densities. 
Another example of public involvement and participation at the TDR programmes has been in 
St. Mary's County, where a taskforce was established to review the county's TDR programme in 2005. 
In the first five years of its implementation, the programme had only been used once, and, by 2005, 
the TDR programme had preserved 1,800 acres of farmland, which was not perceived as satisfactory 
within the county. Therefore, the taskforce, including over 15 members representing different 
stakeholders from the development, agricultural, and environmental communities, as well as members 
from the St. Mary’s County departments, was created to analyse the programme and make 
recommendations. The taskforce, which spent more than two years meetings and negotiating, 
proposed considerable changes to the TDR programme. Due to conflicts of interests, the process of 
policy change was time-consuming and associated with high transaction costs. However, this public 
involvement increased the credibility of the programme, raised public awareness, and built trust 
between the government and other stakeholders. 
 
5.3.6. Policy credibility and consistency 
The credibility and consistency of TDR programmes affects transaction costs through 
decreasing uncertainty, as well as building trust. While the consistency of TDR programmes provides 
stakeholders with higher level of certainty over TDR transactions, frequent rule changes increase 
uncertainties and information collection time. Also, frequent changes in programmes decrease the 
level of institutional knowledge transferability. The rules, regulations, and programmes have been 
modified for a number of reasons. First, in order to change the development pattern of the county, for 
example, Calvert County implemented two major reductions in the underlying zoning and 
comprehensively ‘downzoned’ the entire county in 1999 and 2003. Second, aiming to increase the 
efficacy of programme, Charles County, for example, amended the TDR ordinance in 1999 to require 
the use of TDRs for any increase in density and remove the other possible ways of rezoning land for a 
higher density without using TDRs. Third, inconsistency between the state and counties’ rules and 
regulations brought about changes in the law, for example, the State of Maryland enacted the 
Sustainable Growth and Agricultural Preservation Act (also known as the Septics Law) in 2012, 
where the counties are required to adopt a tier map for future growth. Adoption of this tiering system 
has resulted in major changes in all TDR programmes in Maryland. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Land-use planners use a number of policy instruments to achieve their policy objectives. TDR 
programmes are a market-based approach that has been implemented in several jurisdictions in order 
to protect ecologically sensitive lands, to preserve farmlands, and to redirect future development 
potentials to more preferable areas. The evaluation of market-based instruments, such as TDR 
programmes, is particularly important because of their introduction as an alternative to traditional 
regulatory instruments, and the current argument that the implementation of these alternative 
instruments results in better policy outcomes, in terms of efficiency and equity. TDR programmes, 
theoretically, are assumed to be associated with lower transaction costs due to their market-based 
nature and less need for large informational requirements and information collection activities. High 
transaction costs have a negative influence on the success of any policy instruments through 
decreasing their efficiency. Most of the TDR evaluation research has mainly focused on identifying 
the factors affecting TDR success and there has been a lack of systematic analysis of transaction costs 
in TDR programmes and their potential effect on the success of these programmes. This article 
contributes to the literature by providing insights into an area that has received little attention, the role 
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of institutional design and arrangements in the implementation of TDR programmes, given that 
different institutional attributes may lead to different levels of transaction costs. 
The transaction cost influencing factors are examined in three categories, namely, the 
characteristics of the transaction, the characteristics of the transactor, and the characteristics of the 
policy. The results of this study show that all categories, and their related factors, have influences on 
the transaction costs of TDR programmes, although the significance and distribution of these 
influences vary across the factors and parties involved. Moreover, there are considerable interrelations 
among the factors, in which some factors are connected and affect one another. Among the analysed 
factors, three factors of uncertainty, involvement of intermediaries, and simplicity had a particularly 
remarkable influence on transaction costs of TDR programmes. In a TDR transaction, the main 
uncertainties concern finding a buyer/seller for TDR, negotiating a TDR sale price, and when/how to 
participate in the programme. In terms of the involvement of intermediaries, while land-use attorneys 
have an essential role to play in any TDR transaction, the involvement of brokers appears to be 
associated with the level of uncertainties surrounding the TDR transactions. Through creating a more 
active and transparent TDR market, along with introducing a platform where buyers and sellers can 
easily find each other, transaction costs of TDR programmes could be decreased by reducing 
uncertainties and the need for intermediaries. Likewise, a simplified policy design and streamlined 
administration process also can have a considerable downward impact on transaction costs. The cases 
of Calvert and St. Mary’s counties show that streamlining the administration process, removing 
unnecessary requirements, simplifying the policy instrument, and making it easy to understand, can 
decrease the transaction costs of TDR programmes. It is, however, important to note that transaction 
costs are not necessarily deadweight losses. While some of the costs involved in operating and 
participating in TDR programmes can be considered as deadweight losses that reduce the net social 
benefits of the policy instruments, some parts of such policy-related transaction costs are intended to 
avoid potential contractual hazards, as well as to ensure better policy outcomes. Therefore, the 
aspiration of planners and policy analysts should be to reduce transaction costs for a given policy 
outcome, if options exist, rather to minimise policy-related transaction costs per se. 
Evidence supporting the presence of opportunism and rent-seeking behaviour was found, 
particularly, among the TDR buyers across the TDR case studies. These opportunistic behaviours of 
TDR buyers were mainly in the form of taking advantage of their privileged access to information and 
unwillingness to share their knowledge and experiences. Therefore, the results of this study were 
consistent with the Alexander (2001)’s argument on the higher complexity of buyers’ behaviour, in 
comparison to those of sellers. However, trust and confidence in information shared between parties 
can moderate opportunism and reduce transaction costs through reducing information collection time 
and effort. Trust between involved parties, itself, can be built and promoted by two factors of past 
experiences and social connectedness. TDR programmes are not generally associated with high level 
of asset specificity. Nonetheless, among the different types of asset specificities discussed in this 
paper, the influence of site specificity on transaction costs may be of importance. This can be 
moderated by the policy design, through designating sufficient receiving areas and, more importantly, 
making sure sending and receiving areas are in balance. 
Despite many similarities among the TDR case studies, their different institutional design and 
arrangements resulted in different transaction cost levels and distributions. The institutional attributes 
of the counties may vary in numerous ways, such as: whether the use of TDR is by-right or requires 
additional hearings and approvals; the mechanisms to be used to stabilise TDR prices (i.e. PDR or 
Fee-in-Lieu programmes); the provision of information for potential buyers/sellers; the administration 
requirements regarding the eligibility of lands to participate in the programmes; and, the extent to 
which the stakeholders are involved in the policy design and implementation. The results of this study 
suggest that, if the use of purchased TDRs is by-right, if TDR prices are stable and predictable, and if 
sufficient information is publicly available and equally distributed, parties involved in TDR 
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transactions would incur fewer transaction costs. Therefore, although the market-based nature of the 
TDR programmes limits the influence that the regulatory authorities can have on transaction costs, 
they still play (and need to play) a key role in dealing with transaction costs through designing better 
institutional arrangements and promoting greater certainty within markets. While there has been an 
increasing number of studies considering institutional roles in public policy and economics over the 
last few decades, more work will need to be carried out to determine how, and which, institutional 
designs and arrangements lead to better policy outcomes. 
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